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Abstract
In this paper we construct a composite indicator of political rivalry using factor analysis and
then build a panel dataset of political rivalry levels for 125 countries during the 1984-2012 period.
According to the factor analysis results, while specific institutional quality aspects are fundamental for
defining the degree of political rivalry, political regime specific variables and natural resources rents
do not appear significant. A preliminary analysis of the constructed indicator shows that political
rivalry is clearly inversely related to the level of development, and that there are significant differences
in political rivalry levels among countries, depending on their income and geographical location.
The results of system-GMM estimations of the effect of political rivalry on economic growth clearly
indicate a negative effect, which is equally maintained when other political and institutional variables
are simultaneously considered, and when the model is tested on a number of restricted samples, thus
confirming the robustness of the baseline results. Additionally, regression results for the restricted
samples suggest that the negative effect of political rivalry on growth weakens as the development
level increases.
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1 Introduction
Over the recent years, various researchers have emphasized the key role that political processes and
institutions have in determining efficient policies and conditioning economic performance. A generally
sustained argument is that political processes and institutional quality are important endogenous deter-
minants of economic incentives and interactions, and should be thus regarded crucial in explaining dif-
ferences in economic performance across countries (e.g., Sochirca et al. (2016a), Aisen and Veiga (2013),
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), Acemoglu (2006), Sayer (2000), Persson and Tabellini (1992)).
More recently, the idea that political competition is beneficial for economic growth, as higher degrees
of such competition were traditionally associated to the implementation of growth-enhancing policies (see,
for example, Besley et al. (2010), Wittman (1989)), has been questioned by some researchers. In fact,
a different perspective on this topic suggests that political competition may sometimes be harmful for
economic growth and development (Sochirca et al. (2016a), Acemoglu (2006), Acemoglu (2009), Acemoglu
and Robinson (2006), Lizzeri and Persico (2005)). In particular, Acemoglu (2006), Acemoglu (2009)
emphasizes the idea that the main objective of the political elite may not be to serve the society, but
to keep the control of political power for as long as possible, using it for their own benefit. In this
case, political competition would rather reduce the incentives of the political elite to implement growth-
enhancing and welfare-promoting policies, motivating instead the implementation of distortionary policies
aimed solely at impeding political rival groups from rising to power.
In related research, this negative form of political competition, political rivalry, is generally referred
to as a key factor affecting economic performance by breaking the balance between political power and
economic opportunities, generating political constraints and conditioning the choice and implementation of
policies (e.g., Dixit and Londregan (1995), Dixit et al. (2000), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Acemoglu
(2006), Sochirca et al. (2016a)). For example, Rodrik (1999) suggests that disagreements between political
groups may inflict extra costs on the economy, interpreted in terms of forgone investments and growth
opportunities. Similarly, Dixit and Londregan (1995) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) suggest that
contesting political power may induce economic costs due to its growth-retarding effects. In Acemoglu
(2006) the political elite’s preferences over inefficient policies, due to their pursuit of political power,
compromise long-term investments and lead to poor aggregate economic performance. Sochirca et al.
(2016a) specifically study the effects of political rivalry on a number of macroeconomic indicators (namely,
education, economic growth and income inequality) finding that all are negatively affected by political
rivalry. Thus, when the goals pursued by the political elite, instead of economic efficiency considerations,
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determine the policy choice, a strong negative impact of political rivalry is implied, and the resulting
relation between political institutions and economic outcomes is then characterised by lower efficiency
and higher economic costs (as in e.g. Alesina and Rodrik (1992), Alesina and Perotti (1994), Dixit and
Londregan (1995), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Acemoglu (2006), Sochirca et al. (2016a)). In sum,
political rivalry may in fact distort policies and generate inefficient resource allocations, thus inducing
growth-retarding effects.
In this paper, we aim at contributing to the ongoing debate on this topic. Our objective is to develop a
composite political rivalry indicator and construct a panel dataset for the maximum number of countries
and timespan available, that could be further used for a wide range of applications. We will also test
one possible use of this indicator, by including it in classic growth regressions. To build the indicator,
we employ specific data reduction techniques, such as principal component analysis and factor analysis,
and, to estimate the impact of political rivalry on economic growth, we use the system-GMM estimator.
In constructing the political rivalry indicator, we follow Acemoglu’s view (Acemoglu (2006, 2009)) and
regard political rivalry as the inter-party competition for power of both economic and political nature,
aimed at keeping the political elite in the office and in control for as long as possible. We also follow the
argument that the existence of political rivalry is independent of the political system, as it may arise in
both democratic and non-democratic regimes (Acemoglu (2006, 2009)).1 Data from Cross National Time
Series Data Archive (CNTS, 2015), Database of Political Institutions (DPI, 2012), Economic Freedom of
the World (EFW, 2013), POLITY IV (2014), International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2013) and World
Development Indicators (WDI, 2016) are used for constructing the political rivalry indicator, and data
from Penn World Tables (PWT9.0 ) are used for our growth regressions.
To our knowledge, previous empirical research on this subject is extremely scarce, as so far we can
only refer an empirical study by Sochirca et al. (2016b), estimating the macroeconomic effects of political
rivalry based on a composite indicator built for that purpose. The present study goes beyond the existing
literature both in scope and technical approach. In particular, while the political rivalry indicator used
by Sochirca et al. (2016b) was solely based on theoretical indications, we employ proper data reduction
techniques to define the structure of the composite indicator, which is technically more rigourous. Ad-
ditionally, we use a considerably larger time-span (around 30 years) and work with panel data, instead
of cross-section data, which enables a more comprehensive and robust analysis. Finally, here we use the
system-GMM estimator, which is more consistent and commonly used in growth regressions.
1However, depending on the political regime, we would expect political rivalry to vary in degrees of intensity and forms
of manifestation.
3
Besides reinforcing the support for the hypothesis that political rivalry negatively affects economic
performance, we obtain some important new results. First, this work’s thorough technical approach
regarding the construction of the political rivalry indicator, suggests that natural resources (included as
a component of the political rivalry indicator in Sochirca et al. (2016b)) do not appear important for
defining the political rivalry phenomenon. Second, while both papers generally conclude that political
rivalry has a significant negative economic effect, the previous study found no empirical evidence of such
an effect for the higher income countries. Contrarily, in the present work, the empirical results actually
show that political rivalry has in fact a significant negative impact in the high-income countries as well.
Finally, the creation of a panel dataset containing the political rivalry levels for 125 countries over the
period 1984-2012, which could be further used for a large variety of applications, is a key contribution to
the research community.
The structure of this paper is the following: Section 2 deals with the construction and preliminary
analysis of the composite political rivalry indicator; Section 3 describes our empirical model and presents
the results of our growth regressions and robustness analysis; conclusions are summarized in Section 4.
2 Political Rivalry Indicator
In this section we explain the construction of the composite political rivalry indicator, using two alter-
native data reduction tecniques. We aim at creating an accurate indicator reflecting the phenomenon of
political rivalry and consequently a panel dataset containing the political rivalry levels for the maximum
number of countries and time span available, which could be further used in a large variety of applica-
tions. In Subsection 2.1 we discuss in more detail the variables selected to describe the political rivalry
phenomenon and in Subsections 2.2 and 2.3 we use principal component analysis and factor analysis to
reduce the data, construct the political rivalry indicator and perform a preliminary analysis of its variation
accross countries and over time.
2.1 Variables selection
Given the complex nature of the political rivalry phenomenon, it can not be proxied by only one vari-
able. Moreover, selecting variables that would accurately reflect political rivalry is a rather intricate task,
since, besides being a multidisciplinary concept, political rivalry is still a new and practically unexplored
issue in economics.
Based on the theoretical considerations discussed above, in constructing the political rivalry indicator
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we shall consider two building blocks - the political and economic dimensions - as jointly determining
the degree of rivalry between the political elite and other social groups. In particular, data from the
political dimension should reflect: how interested the elite is to remain in power and how various political
groups interact and compete with each other; what is the degree of institutional independence from
political pressures and of state appropriation by the interests of the political elite; if specific aspects of
institutional quality help mitigating the possible adverse effects of political rivalry. On their turn, data
from the economic dimension should reflect: the efficiency of creating an environment enabling private
sector development; creation of adequate incentives for physical and human capital investments; economic
costs of institutional inefficiency; and exclusive benefits, which may aggravate political rivalry.
In selecting the variables to be included in our statistical data reduction exercises, we take into consid-
eration these two dimensions, with the concern to generally avoid variables with overlapping information.
We started by inspecting a large number (over 30) of political, institutional and economic variables from
a number of data sources. An initial pre-selection, based essentially on the theory and on data availabil-
ity, led to a set of 11 variables to be potentially included in the empirical analysis.2 We subsequently
restricted the anaysis to seven variables, by excluding: some of the sub-components of one index variable;
variables that were considered less relevant; one variable for which data were not available. The finally
selected variables are the following: legis03 from Cross National Time Series Data Archive (CNTS, 2015),
checks from Database of Political Institutions (DPI, 2012), legal sysitem & property rights from Economic
Freedom of the World (EFW, 2013), polity2 and durable from POLITY IV (2014), political risk from
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2013) and natural resources rents from World Development
Indicators (WDI, 2016). Table 1 below summarizes the variables names, sources and description, and
specifies whether the variable is expected to increase or decrease the degree of political rivalry.
2Please see Appendix A for a detailed description of these initially selected 11 variables.
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Table 1: Variables description
Variables and
sources
Variables description Expected
influence
legis03 (CNTS) Effectiveness of the legislature. -
checks (DPI) Checks and balances based on legislative and executive indices of
electoral competitiveness.
-
political risk
(ICRG)
Six (out of twelve) factors, termed political risk components, such as:
government’s ability to carry out its declared programs and its ability
to stay in office; corruption within the political system as a threat to
foreign investment and a distortion to the economic and financial
environment; strength of the legal system and public observance of
the law; degree of government responsiveness to its people; overall
institutional strength and beaurocracy quality.
-
polity2
(POLITY IV)
General regime effects (ranging from democracy to autocracy)
evaluated in terms of openness and competitiveness of executive
recruitment, constraints on chief executive, and regulation and
competitiveness of participation.
-
durable
(POLITY IV)
Regime durability expressed in the number of years since the last
regime change or the end of a transition period defined by the lack of
stable political institutions.
-
legal system &
property rights
(EFW)
Nine sub-components reflecting the judicial independence and
impartial courts, integrity of the legal system, legal enforcement of
contracts, military interference in rule of law and politics, protection
of property rights, regulatory restrictions, reliability of police,
business costs of crime.
-
natural resources
rents (WDI)
Sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral
rents, and forest rents (expressed as a % of GDP).
+
In Table 1, the column “Variables and source” includes variables’ names as they appear in the respective
database and the abbreviated database name, while the column “Variables description” contains a brief
description of each variable as given by the source.3 Inspection of variables’ descriptions shows that
variables legis03, checks, polity2, durable and political risk reflect aspects of the political dimension of
political rivalry, while the variable natural resources rents reflects aspects of the economic dimension; the
variable legal system & property rights, on its turn, has elements of both dimensions. The last column -
3Note that two of our variables, political risk and legal system & property rights, are aggregate variables for which we
do not present the composing elements here (please see the ICRG and EFW user guides, available online, for more details).
We also note that we exclude some components (such as internal and external conflicts, religious and ethnic tensions and
military in politics) from the political risk aggregate variable, as we consider them irrelevant for political rivalry. The final
political risk aggregate value was proportionately recalculated applying the specific weights for the remaining components
used in the construction of political rivalry indicator.
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“Expected influence”, specifies whether a variable is expected to have a decreasing or an increasing effect
on political rivalry. Namely, recalling our previous discussion on the definition of political rivalry, countries
with higher values for the first six variables and lower values for the last variable are expected to exhibit
lower degrees of political rivalry.
Next, we will use data reduction techniques to assess the extent of each variable’s contribution to the
composite political rivalry indicator to be constructed.
2.2 Data reduction techniques
Two formal techniques are commonly employed in the construction of composite indicators: the prin-
cipal component analysis and the factor analysis. Both are recognised statistical techniques used for data
reduction and also for detecting an underlying structure in the data, which can be particularly relevant
when approaching complex and directly unmeasurable phenomena (see, for example, Dancey and Reidy
(2004), Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006), Aisen and Veiga (2013)). These techniques basically imply re-
taining a number of components or factors (represented by a series of uncorrelated linear combinations of
the original variables), which: (i) are able to explain most of the variance contained in the data; (ii) can
be adequately interpreted; (iii) can be analytically combined in a more accurate joint representation of the
studied phenomenon. An important characteristic of the retained components / factors is that, because
they are uncorrelated, they are able to capture distinct dimensions in the analysed data. However, each
additional component or factor explains a consecutively smaller proportion of the variance contained in
the original variables and thus the contribution of each newly retained factor is marginally decreasing.
This implies that only the factors that explain the larger part of variance contained in the original data
should be used for a meaningful description of the studied phenomenon (Tabachnick and Fidell (2001),
Lattin et al. (2003)).
Before applying the principal component analysis and factor analysis techniques in our statistical
exercises, we first perform a number of standard tests and diagnostic procedures to check if our data
satisfies the general criteria required for a robust data reduction exercise. We start by inspecting the data
adequability by checking the descriptive statistics, confirming the variables types, correlations and sample
size, and by performing the tests (namely, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test and Bartlett’s test of Sphericity)
commonly used for evaluating if the data can be properly treated by data reduction techniques, all
summarized in Tables 2 and 3.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
legis03 5,506 1.804577 0.9282844 0 3
checks 5,280 2.632765 1.717109 1 18
political risk 3,824 68.75266 18.98281 7.083333 110.7292
polity2 5,349 2.03066 7.132953 -10 10
durable 5,424 24.04388 29.60954 0 205
legal system & property rights 2,461 5.512328 1.772601 1.160997 9.62463
natural resources rents 5,602 9.687764 14.0198 0 92.01895
As Table 2 shows, all our variables are continuous or discrete and our initial dataset contains at least
2461 observations, which by far satisfies the commonly required cases-to-variables ratio of at least 5 times
as many observations as variables, as well as the rule of “200+” cases (see, for example, Hair et al. (1998),
Stevens (2002)). Also, the descriptive statistics indicate that our data have a high degree of variability
across countries and over time, which is indeed a desirable characteristic for both principal component
and factor analyses.
Inspection of the correlation matrix in Table 3 confirms that, while no cases of multicollinearity have
been detected in our sample, there are a few cases of correlations around the minimum threshold for
variables checks, polity2 and natural resources rents.4 However, given that the results of both Bartlett’s
Test of Sphericity and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test for detecting multicollinearity suggest the adequability of
carrying out a principal component or a factor analysis on our data (the hypothesis that the variables are
uncorelated is rejected for 1% of significance and the KMO measure is 0.76), we opt to keep all variables
in the first stage of our data reduction exercises (Kaiser (1974), Pallant (2007), Hair et al. (1998)).5
4Note that, for the variables to be considered suitable for factor analysis, the correlations should be at least 0.3 or greater,
as searching for common factors would make no sense for weakely related variables; multicollinearity issues can arise for
correlations above 0.9, which could increase the standard error of factor loadings, making them less reliable and more difficult
to interpret (see e.g. Field (2005), Lattin et al. (2003)).
5At a later stage, we gradually exclude the variables with insufficient factor loadings, which are precisely those with
initially lower correlations, i.e. variables checks, polity2 and natural resources rents (see our discussion below on factor
analyses results).
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Table 3: Variables’ correlation matrix
Variables
correlations
legal system
& property
rights
checks polity2
political
risk
legis03 durable
natural
resources
rents
legal system &
property rights
1.0000 - - - - - -
checks 0.2282 1.0000 - - - - -
polity2 0.3096 0.6028 1.0000 - - - -
political risk 0.8238 0.3148 0.4830 1.0000 - - -
legis03 0.5286 0.4801 0.7625 0.6033 1.0000 - -
durable 0.5893 0.2029 0.2552 0.5817 0.4541 1.0000 -
natural resources
rents
-0.2501 -0.2433 -0.4843 -0.3134 --0.4106 -0.1762 1.0000
Number of observations: 1, 847
Bartlett test of sphericity: Chi-square = 7041.342 Degrees of freedom = 21 p-value = 0.000 H0: variables are not intercorrelated
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy KMO = 0.763
Next, we explain our choice of the data reduction technique. Many authors indicate that for sufficiently
large samples, as is our case, both principal component analysis and factor analysis yield similar results
(see, for example, Hair et al. (1998)). There is, however, one important difference to be considered: while
principal component analysis uses, by assumption, all variability contained in the data, factor analysis
uses only the variability that is actually shared by all variables (Fabrigar et al. (1999), Dancey and Reidy
(2004)). Thus, in order to determine which technique is more suitable in our case, we start by performing
a principal component factor analysis, that will inform us if the retained principal components can, in
fact, explain all variance in our original data. In analysing the obtained results, summarized in Table 4,
we are specifically interested in the uniqueness values, which give us the percentage of variance for each
variable that is not explained by the principal components retained.
Table 4: Results of the principal component factor analysis
Factors Eigenvalues Cumulative
variance explained
Variables F1 loadings F2 loadings Uniqueness
F1 3.67870 0.5255 legal system &
property rights
0.7605 0.5097 0.1619
F2 1.28307 0.7088 legis03 0.8580 -0.1709 0.2346
F3 0.76744 0.8185 political_risk 0.8400 0.3581 0.1661
F4 0.48103 0.8872 checks 0.5897 -0.4889 0.4132
F5 0.44545 0.9508 natural
resources rents
-0.5372 0.3596 0.5821
F6 0.20975 0.9808 polity2 0.7752 -0.4969 0.1521
F7 0.13456 1.0000 durable 0.6491 0.5005 0.3282
Factor analysis/correlation; Method: principal-component factors
Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Kaiser off)
Number of obs = 1847; Retained factors = 2
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(21) = 7045.16; Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
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The last column of Table 4 illustrates that uniqueness values for all variables are considerably greater
than zero. This clearly indicates that there is substancial variability left in the data after the principal
components have been retained, thus allowing us to conclude that the principal component technique is
inappropriate for our data. Therefore, all further data reduction exercises for constructing a composite
political rivalry indicator are performed using factor analysis.
We start by performing a first factor analysis (FA1 ), which includes all seven variables and whose
results are presented in Table 5.
Table 5: FA1 results and factor loadings
Factors Eigenvalues Cumulative
variance explained
Variables F1 loadings Uniqueness
F1 3.29989 0.8468 legal system &
property rights
0.7465 (0.8660) 0.2703
F2 0.86615 1.0690 legis03 0.8288 (0.4678) 0.7176
F3 0.06349 1.0853 political_risk 0.8292 (0.8306) 0.5949
F4 0.00819 1.0874 checks 0.5153 (0.1442) 0.2222
F5 -0.06889 1.0697 natural resources rents -0.4519 (-0.1904) 0.1931
F6 -0.09698 1.0448 polity2 0.7513 (0.2135) 0.5612
F7 -0.17477 1.0000 durable 0.5779 (0.6344) 0.2030
Factor analysis/correlation; Method: principal factors
Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Kaiser off)
Number of obs = 1847; Retained factors = 4
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(21) = 7045.16; Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
Analysing the results of FA1 in Table 5, we can see that, from the four retained common factors with
positive eigenvalues, only the first one is relevant for our analysis.6 Namely, only factor1 has a positive
eigenvalue greater than 1, explaining around 85% of the variance contained in the original data7 and
displaying several highly significant variable loadings, namely four variables with loadings above 0.7, of
which two above 0.8.8 We can also see that all variables loadings on the first common factor retained are
consistent with the expected (positive or negative) impact of each variable on political rivalry, as specified
in Table 1. In particular, recalling that our political rivalry indicator should be inversely read (i.e. the
higher its value the lower the political rivalry level), the loadings signs indicate a positive influence of all
variables except that of the natural resources rents variable. All this confirms that factor1 satisfies the
6Note that, athough initially we did not impose any restrictions on the number of common factors to be retained,
subsequently we will only use common factors satisfying the usually applied criteria, which may include: considering only
factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, imposing a minimum level of variance explained by the common factors, excluding
variables with loadings below a certain level and inspecting if the loadings signs are maintained on all relevant factors (see,
for example, Dunteman (1989), Hatcher (1994), Johnson (1998) and Stevens (2002) for more details on guideline criteria for
retaining factors).
7Note that here (as well as in FA2 ) the cumulative proportion of the total variance explained by the factors with positive
eigenvalues exceeds 1 due to the (negative) contribution of the factors with negative eigenvalues.
8The literature usually refers a minimum of three significant variable loadings for each factor; the significance level can be
determined by the rule of thumb based on sample size (as in e.g. Stevens (2002)), which, given the number of observations
in our sample, is already verified.
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usual criteria and thus can be further used in the construction of our composite political rivalry indicator.
We also inspect the values in the “uniqueness” column, which, as previously refered, inform us about
the common factors’ explanatory power for each variable. We can then see that the variable natural
resources rents appears to be poorly explained by the common factors retained, exhibiting a uniqueness
value of 0.72 (implying that the retained common factors explain less than 30% of the variable’s variance),
which is above the usually refered threshold of 0.6. This may be due to the fact that it is the only variable
outside the political-institutional domain in this analysis and thus may not share with other variables
significant common features to be captured by the common factors retained.9 All other variables have
uniqueness values below 0.6 and thus appear to be well explained by the common factors retained.
In order to decide if all variables should be in fact included in the composite political rivalry indicator,
we perform the usual procedure of rotating the initial results, applying the standard varimax rotation.
The goal of this procedure is to obtain a clear pattern of high loadings for some variables and low loadings
for others for each of the common factors retained. Evaluating the relevance of each of the seven initial
variables, we consider the usual loading threshold of 0.3 to confirm significance. Thus, inspection of factor1
rotated loadings (given in parentheses in column “Factor1 loadings”) in Table 4 shows that variables checks,
polity2 and natural resources rents do not reach the minimum loading level, which suggests dropping these
variables from the construction of our composite political rivalry indicator.
We thus perform a second factor analysis, FA2, which excludes the variables checks, polity2 and natural
resources rents, and the results of which are summarized in Table 6 below.10 The intuition behind the
exclusion of these three variables is the following. On the one hand, Acemoglu (2009) does not, in fact,
consider democracy (proxied by variable polity2 in our analysis) as a guarantee of institutional quality,
sustaining that political rivalry may arise in any kind of political regime. On the other hand, checks
and balances mechanisms (and consequently, the variable checks, according to its definition in DPI, see
Table 1) are directly related to the degree of democracy in a society. Finally, as natural resources do not
represent institutional or political characteristics, the relation between natural resources rents and the
other variables can be expectedly weaker. These considerations, together with the three variables’ low
loadings in FA1 , may in fact make them less relevant for the construction of the political rivalry indicator.
9Recall that factor analysis considers only the variables’ commonly shared variance in retaining common factors, which
naturally alienates the natural resources rents variable.
10As in FA1, here we also previously exclude correlation and multicollinearity problems, and confirm that there are no
outliers that might affect correlations and thus distort results.
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Table 6: FA2 results and factor loadings
Factors Eigenvalues Cumulative
variance explained
Variables F1 loadings Uniqueness
F1 2.38528 1.0901 legal system &
property rights
0.8663 0.5746
F2 -0.01582 1.0828 legis03 0.6522 0.2495
F3 -0.04276 1.0633 political_risk 0.8920 0.5863
F4 -0.13847 1.0000 durable 0.6432 0.2043
Factor analysis/correlation; Method: principal factors
Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Kaiser off)
Number of obs = 1902; Retained factors = 1
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(21) = 3959.04; Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
As it can be seen, the exclusion of the variables that exhibited insufficient loadings in FA1 generally
improved the significance of the variables included and the common factor retained in FA2, as all 4 variables
now have loadings above 0.64; aditionally, all variables appear to be well explained by the retained factor,
as all uniqueness values are below 0.6. We also note that, because FA2 retained only one positive common
factor (with an eigenvalue greater than 1 and explaining all variance contained in the original data),11
initial results are equal to rotated results. Although the results of FA2 are more consistent and robust in
terms of the variables’ significance and the retained factor’s explanatory power, we will use the results of
both factor analyses to build two political rivalry indicators, one reference indicator and a secondary one
(see Tables 7 and 8 below) as explained in detail in the next subsection.
2.3 Construction and preliminary analysis of the Political Rivalry Indicator
In this subsection we explain the construction of two political rivalry indicators, PR and PR1, which
we build using the results of the two factor analyses performed, and also conduct a preliminary analysis
of the obtained indicators (summarized below)
Table 7: Political Rivalry Indicators
Political rivalry indicators Factor analysis Variables included
Reference indicator, PR Based on results of FA2 legal system & property rights, legis03 , durable, political
risk
Secondary indicator, PR1 Based on results of FA1 legal system & property rights, legis03 , checks, polity2 ,
durable, political risk , natural resources rents
In constructing the indicators, we proceed in the following manner. Using the factor scoring coefficients
as weights, we calculate the common factors for each country-year available observation as a weighted
11Here again, due to the negative contribution of the common factors with negative eigenvalues.
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sum of variables considered in the analysis. The factor scoring coefficients are obtained by the regression
method, as suggested by Thomson (1951); as we are using factor analysis, the weights are applied to the
standardized versions of the variables. Given that both FA1 and FA2 each retained only one common
factor, the composite political rivalry indicators are then simply equal to the calculated common factors.
We obtain two panel datasets, one for PR, with 125 countries, and another for PR1, with 126 countries,
with annual values for the period between 1984-2012.12 Table 8 below summarizes the discriptive statistics
for both indicators.
Table 8: Descriptive statistics for PR and PR1
Political rivalry Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
indicator
PR 1,902 -1.19e-09 0.9340121 -2.636263 2.315111
PR1 1,847 -4.33e-10 0.9550382 -2.520101 2.007803
As previously emphasized, the constructed indicators inversely reflect the political rivalry level, that
is, the higher an indicator’s value, the lower the political rivalry level. We also recall that, as factor
analysis uses standardized versions of variables to calculate common factors, the obtained political rivalry
indicators have a zero mean and a unit standard deviation.13 The descriptive statistics in Table 8 show
that there is considerable heterogeneity in the data, as the values of PR and PR1 range from −2.636263
(for Haiti) and −2.520101 (for Congo) to 2.315111 and 2.007803 (for USA), respectively.
In our subsequent preliminary analysis, we will focus on our reference indicator of political rivalry,
PR.14 In particular, given our data heterogeneity, we further explore the PR dataset by considering
subgroups of countries with similar characteristics. To do so, we apply the World Bank classifications by
region and income per capita, and desagregate the complete sample into four income and six geographic
groups, as shown in Table 9:15
12Not included in this paper but available for research purposes upon request.
13Note that, deviations from mean 0 and standard error 1 in the reported results in Table 8 are due to numerical roundoff
and to the factor model solution found by the estimation method used.
14The same analysis has been performed using our secondary political rivalry indicator, PR1, for which the results are
very similar and therefore not reported here to save space.
15The complete list of countries belonging to each income and geo group is provided in Appendix B.
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Table 9: Income and Geo Groups
Income groups Geo groups
income1 high-income geo1 Advanced economies (Western Europe, USA, Canada and Oceania)
income2 upper-middle geo2 Europe and Central Asia
income3 lower-middle geo3 South & East Asia and Pacific
income4 low-income geo4 Latin America and Caribbean
geo5 Middle East and North Africa
geo6 Sub-Saharan Africa
In order to obtain the mean values of the reference political rivalry indicator for each group, we
estimate two simple regressions of PR on four income and six geo dummy variables. Then, using the
estimated coefficients from each regression, we perform Wald tests on the coefficients’ equality to evaluate
the significance of political rivalry differences between different income and geo groups. More specifically,
we use two simple estimation models, as follows:
1) by income per capita:
PRi,t = α1income1,i + α2income2,i + α3income3,i + α4income4,i + ui,t (1)
2) by geographic location:
PRi,t = β1geo1,i + β2geo2,i + β3geo3,i + β4geo4,i + β5geo5,i + β6geo6,i + vi,t (2)
where: PRi,t is the value of the reference political rivalry indicator in country i in year t; incomej,i for
j = 1, 2, 3, 4, is a dummy variable assuming the value 1 if country i belongs to income group j, and the
value 0 otherwise; geok,i for k = 1, 2, ..., 6, is a dummy variable assuming the value 1 if country i belongs
to geo group k, and the value 0 otherwise; ui,t and vi,t are the usual error terms.
Table 10 below presents the estimation results of regressions 1 and 2. The results of the Wald equality
tests on every pair of coefficients α and β are summarized in Tables 11 and 12, respectively.
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Table 10: PR regressions by income and geo groups
Dummy variables
in Regression (1)
Coefficient estimates αˆ
Dummy variables
in Regression (2)
Coefficient estimates βˆ
income1 0.9315762*** (37.44) geo1 1.36374*** (51.93)
income2 -0.293671*** (-13.02) geo2 0.1183062*** (4.28)
income3 -0.6491896*** (-24.15) geo3 -0.1881549*** (-4.06)
income4 -0.8524156*** (-27.41) geo4 -0.4665186*** (-14.53)
- - geo5 -0.0775475* (-1.80)
- - geo6 -0.6934052*** (-24.33)
R2 0.62 R2 0.60
N 1902 N 1902
Estimation method: Ordinary Least Squares;
The level of significance is denoted by ∗∗∗ and ∗, for 1% and 10% respectively;
t-statistics are reported in brackets.
Inspecting the coefficient estimates αˆ and βˆ in Table 10 (representing the mean values of PR in
each income and geo group, respectively), we can see that countries from the high-income and advanced
economies groups exhibit, as expected, the highest mean values of PR. In other words, countries belonging
to these two groups have the lowest average levels of political rivalry, compared to all other income or geo
groups. On the contrary, countries from the low-income and Sub-Saharan Africa groups have the highest
levels of political rivalry. Furthermore, the results of the Wald tests of coefficients’ equality reported in
Tables 11 and 12 show that all income groups have statistically different mean values of PR, for 1% of
significance; the same is verified for the geo groups, with the exceptions of the pairs geo3- geo4, and geo5-
geo6, for which the mean values of PR are not significantly different. This suggests that there may be an
important link between political rivalry and the income per capita level, and that geographical distance
can, in fact, imply significant differences in political and institutional organization.
Table 11: Wald tests on coefficients’ equality of Regression (1)
Coefficients α1 α2 α3 α4
α1 - ***(1331.34) ***(1862.63) ***(2006.11)
α2 ***(1331.34) - ***(102.67) ***(211.52)
α3 ***(1862.63) ***(102.67) - ***(24.44)
α4 ***(2006.11) ***(211.52) ***(24.44) -
∗∗∗
denotes rejection of tested hypothesis αi = αj , i 6= j, for 1% of significance;
F -statistics are reported in brackets.
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Table 12: Wald tests on coefficients’ equality of Regression (2)
Coefficients β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6
β1 − ***(615.15) ***(963.97) ***(1681.68) ***(1771.79) ***(2969.46)
β2 ***(615.15) - ***(74.35) ***(89.16) ***(288.27) ***(448.50)
β3 ***(963.97) ***(74.35) - (0.97) ***(53.47) ***(91.90)
β4 ***(1681.68) ***(89.16) (0.97) - ***(94.16) ***(175.33)
β5 ***(1771.79) ***(288.27) ***(53.47) ***(94.16) - (2.07)
β6 ***(2969.46) ***(448.50) ***(91.90) ***(175.33) (2.07) -
∗∗∗
denotes rejection of tested hypothesis βi = βj , i 6= j, for 1% of significance;
F -statistics are reported in brackets.
Additionally, Figure 1 below represents the political rivalry dynamics across the world during the last
thirty years. It can be seen that the overall general trend is positive, that is the political rivalry level tends
to decrease across the world, which can be due to a general improvement of institutional quality in most
countries. The highest increase in the PR indicator, corresponding to a decrease in the political rivalry
level, clearly occured in the 1990’s. However, a slight deterioration can be noted around 2008-2012, at the
time of the recent international financial crisis. Figure 1 also clearly illustrates the differences in political
rivalry levels among the six geo groups: there is a large gap between political rivalry in the advanced
economies and in the rest of the world, of which the least developed countries (from the Sub-Saharan
Africa group) exhibit the highest degree of political rivalry.
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Figure 1: Political rivalry across the world, 1984-2012
Given that our data reduction exercises allowed us to create a panel dataset for a large number of
countries and a relatively long time span, the constructed indicator(s) can be used in a variety of fields of
applied research. In the next section of this paper we will test one possible application, by including PR
(and also PR1) as an explanatory variable in a classic growth regression model.
3 Application: growth regression
In this section we test the applicability of the constructed composite political rivalry indicator by
estimating the effect of political rivalry on economic growth using dynamic panel data models. We
perform a baseline regression and several robustness tests to assess the relevance and robustness of the
constructed indicator.
3.1 Data and model specification
Annual data on the explanatory variables (except PR) are collected from the Penn World Tables 9.0
and from the Barro-Lee educational dataset, covering the period between 1980-2014 and including 107
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countries.16 The estimations are performed using seven consecutive, non-overlapping 5-year periods from
1980 to 2014, namely: 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2009, 2010-2014.
Our empirical analysis is based on the panel data growth models commonly used in recent literature,
in which the economic growth rate is represented as follows:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = (α− 1)yi,t−1 + βXi,t + γPRi,t + ui + vt + εi,t (3)
where yi,t denotes the log of real GDP per capita of country i at the end of period t, (its lag is included
in the right hand-side to account for convergence), ui and vt denote the country- and time-specific effects
respectively, and εi,t is the usual error term. The variable PRi,t is our reference political rivalry indicator
and the vector Xi,t includes current or lagged values of the remaining explanatory variables commonly
considered in the growth literature, as follows:
- investment (% GDP);
- one period lagged years of secondary schooling, as a measure of human capital;
- population growth rate;
- trade openness (share of net exports in GDP).
Since here we consider a dynamic growth model for the level of yi,t, we can rewrite (3), highlighting
the presence of a lagged endogenous variable, as follows:
yi,t = αyi,t−1 + βXi,t + γPRi,t + ui + vt + εi,t (4)
in which α 6= 1.
Traditional methods of panel estimation have been proven to be inadequate for estimating growth
regressions with panel data, usually producing biased and inconsistent coefficients and unable to deal
properly with endogeneity problems (see e.g. Bond et al. (2001), Voitchovsky (2005)). In order to remove
the unobserved time-invariant effects, ui, and to properly control for endogeneity and measurement error,
we first-difference (4)(as in the first-difference GMM technique, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991)),
which yields:
4yi,t = α4 yi,t−1 + β4Xi,t + γ4 PRi,t +4vt +4εi,t (5)
However, given that important information in the data may be lost in the process of differencing
16Which is below the initial 125 in the PR panel dataset, due to exclusion of observations with missing values.
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the dynamic growth model, consistency and precision concerns have motivated the increasing use of the
system-GMM estimation technique. It can be seen as an extended version of the first-difference GMM as
it combines moment conditions for the equations in first-difference, (5), with additional moment conditions
for the equations in levels, (4), having been referred to increase estimation efficiency (see Arellano and
Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998)). Many researchers sustain that in cases when explanatory
variables are highly persistent over time and when their variation is mostly cross-sectional, as is the case
of political rivalry, the system-GMM estimator yields more precise and less biased estimated coefficients
and is more robust than the traditional estimators and the first-difference GMM (for details, see Blundell
and Bond (1998), Blundell and Bond (2000), Bond et al. (2001) and Voitchovsky (2005)). Thus, following
the common practice in the literature, we use the system-GMM estimator in our growth regressions.
3.2 Empirical results
The discussion of the empirical results is structured in two subsections: baseline regression and robust-
ness analysis. In the baseline regression of our model we focus on the reference political rivalry indicator,
PR, and we use consecutive, non-overlapping 5-year periods. The baseline regression results are reported
in Table 13. Then, we perform several robustness tests by considering alternative period-lengths of 4 and
6 years,17 including other political variables as additional regressors, and restricting our initial sample.
The results of this robustness analysis are summarized in Tables 14 and 15.
Baseline regression results
The baseline regression estimates the effect of our reference political rivalry indicator, PR, on GDP
per capita growth using the system-GMM method. These results are reported in column 1 of Table 13.
Following common practice in growth regressions, we treat all the explanatory variables as endogenous
in order to avoid potential problems of endogeneity that may be caused by reverse effects of growth. We
also report the fixed effects estimation results, in column 2, which we use only for comparison reasons in
order to rule out possible specification problems in the system-GMM.18 Additionally, out of investigative
curiosity, we perform the same analyses using the secondary political rivalry indicator, PR1, the results
of which are shown in columns 3 (system-GMM estimations) and 4 (fixed effects estimations).
For all regressions reported in Table 13, the coefficients of the classical growth determinants have the
17Taking longer time intervals, up to 10 years, would have the drawback of generating a small number of periods and
observations.
18As Aisen and Veiga (2013) refer, GMM models can be quite sensitive to the set of instruments and lag length chosen
and, therefore, it may be useful to compare their results with the simple fixed effects results. This procedure allows ruling
out possible system-GMM specification problems if the pattern of statistical significance of the coefficients yielded by the
two estimators tends to be similar.
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usual expected signs and are higly significant, at 1% and 5%. As expected, initial GDP per capita has a
negative estimated effect on growth, thus accounting for conditional convergence. The estimated effect on
growth is also negative for population growth and is positive for investment, secondary years of schooling
and trade openess. As to our main research interest regarding the effect of political rivalry on growth,
the baseline results show that there is a significant negative impact, at 5% (p− value = 0.019). Namely,
and recalling that the constructed political rivalry indicator should be inversely read, the results reported
in column 1 imply that a one point increase in the PR indicator results in an increase of around 1.19
percentage points in the annual GDP per capita growth. Taking into account the political rivalry time
trends between 1990-2000 presented in Figure 1 above (see Section 2), a 0.4 point increase in the PR
indicator attainable in 5 years on average, would allow the economy to grow 0.48 percentage points in the
same period, which is not economically negligible. When PR1 is alternatively considered, the estimated
negative effect on growth is not statistically significant. In fact, recalling that the secondary political
rivalry indicator, PR1, also includes variables polity2, durable and natural resouces rents, which do not
appear relevant for reflecting the political rivalry phenomenon (see our factor analysis in Section 2), its
impact on economic growth could be expected less significant.
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Table 13: Baseline regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Explanatory variables System-GMM Fixed Effects System-GMM Fixed Effects
Initial GDP per capita (log) -0.0262*** (-5.340) -0.0794*** (-12.94) -0.0248*** (-4.550) -0.0778*** (-11.73)
Investment (% GDP) 0.220*** (3.908) 0.124*** (3.152) 0.243*** (4.489) 0.128*** (3.024)
Years of Secondary Schooling 0.0121*** (3.453) 0.0244*** (5.284) 0.0129*** (3.637) 0.0257*** (5.284)
Population growth -0.616** (-2.504) -0.759*** (-4.328) -0.614** (-2.059) -0.766*** (-4.036)
Trade openness 0.0273*** (2.626) 0.0216** (2.218) 0.0315*** (2.732) 0.0192** (2.032)
PR 0.0119** (2.346) 0.0278*** (5.012) - -
PR1 - - 0.00634 (1.123) 0.0214*** (3.623)
Number of observations 575 575 554 554
Number of countries 107 107 106 106
Adjusted R-squared - 0.349 - 0.325
Number of instruments 95 - 95 -
Hansen test (p-value) 0.211 - 0.271 -
AR1 test (p-value) 5.60e-07 - 4.34e-06 -
AR2 test (p-value) 0.189 - 0.159 -
Estimation methods: system-GMM for dynamic panel-data models and fixed effects; sample period: 1980–2012;
All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous; their three period lagged values were used as instruments in the
first-difference equations and their once lagged first-differences were used in the levels equation;
∗∗∗ and ∗∗ denotes rejection of null hypotheses for 1% and 5% of significance respectively; t-statistics are reported in brackets.
Robustness analysis
All the robustness tests results, reported in Tables 14 and 15, confirm the conclusions of the baseline
regression regarding the effect of political rivalry on growth.19
First, we re-estimate the baseline regression using alternative period-lengths, of 4 and 6 years. The
obtained results, reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 14, confirm that political rivalry remains statistically
significant, at 5%.
Second, we add two new political variables to our growth regression, namely regime changes and
political competition (variables change and polcomp from POLITY IV database). The first variable
19We note that, in some robustness tests, small adjustments to the instrument matrix were necessary in order to avoid
that the number of instruments exceeds the number of countries, as well as to ensure that the Hansen statistic confirms the
validity of instruments used.
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reflects pro-democratic or pro-autocratic authority changes in the political organization of a country; the
second variable reflects the regulation and competitiveness of political participation and could be thus
regarded as a “healthy” political competition. The results reported in column 3 of Table 14 confirm the
robustness of the baseline regression, as political rivalry continues highly relevant for economic growth,
at 1%. Regarding regime changes, its estimated effect on growth is negative and only weakly significant,
at 10%, while political competition appears to have no significant effects on economic growth.
Third, we check if the baseline regression results are robust to sample restrictions, by excluding one
group of countries at a time.20 Regression results for the restricted samples based on the previously
defined geo groups, summarized in Table 14, again confirm that our baseline estimations are robust to
sample restrictions, as the negative effect of political rivalry on economic growth remains significant in
practically all subsamples,21 with the coefficients ranging from 0.0111 to 0.0348. Note that the strongest
effect is estimated for the subsample that excludes the advanced economies, which may suggest that the
magnitude of the political rivalry negative effect on growth weakens as the development level increases.
20Here, the countries are grouped applying the geographical location criteria as in our preliminary PR analysis in Section
2.
21The only exception is the subsample which excludes countries belonging to the Europe and Central Asia group, where
the estimated negative effect of PR on economic growth is not statistically significant.
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Table 14: Robustness regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Explanatory variables 4-year periods 6-year periods 5-year periods
Initial GDP per capita (log) -0.0366*** (-4.179) -0.0271*** (-3.917) -0.0368*** (-4.814)
Investment (% GDP) 0.264*** (3.310) 0.182*** (2.736) 0.221*** (2.844)
Years of Secondary Schooling 0.0132* (1.773) 0.00918** (2.055) 0.0151*** (2.797)
Population growth -1.261*** (-3.405) -1.267*** (-3.144) -0.954*** (-3.229)
Trade oppeness 0.107** (2.497) 0.0334 (1.537) 0.0272*** (5.123)
PR 0.0150** (2.043) 0.0127** (2.110) 0.0305*** (3.505)
change - - -0.000328* (-1.727)
polcomp - - -0.00139 (-0.708)
Number of observations 465 466 201
Number of countries 102 103 77
Number of instruments 84 74 71
Hansen test (p-value) 0.181 0.153 0.444
AR1 test (p-value) 0.00884 0.00745 0.0701
AR2 test (p-value) 0.749 0.694 0.197
System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models; sample period: 1980–2012;
All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous;
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denotes rejection of null hypotheses for 1%, 5% and 10% of significance respectively;
t-statistics are reported in brackets.
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Table 15: Robustness regressions: restricted samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Explanatory variables geo1 geo2 geo3 geo4 geo5 geo6
Initial GDP per capita (log) -0.0251***
(-4.468)
-0.0270***
(-4.872)
-0.0282***
(-5.762)
-0.0265***
(-4.913)
-0.0288***
(-5.525)
-0.0324***
(-6.098)
Investment (% GDP) 0.137***
(2.088)
0.274***
(4.202)
0.211***
(2.675)
0.242***
(3.159)
0.197***
(3.900)
0.226***
(4.792)
Secondary School
Enrollment
0.00826**
(2.007)
0.0121**
(2.316)
0.0118***
(2.859)
0.0114***
(3.085)
0.0139***
(4.748)
0.0149***
(5.078)
Population growth -0.575**
(-2.007)
-0.704**
(-2.204)
-0.572**
(-2.148)
-0.717**
(-2.477)
-0.859**
(-2.491)
-0.487*
(-1.896)
Trade oppeness 0.0236**
(2.432)
0.0336**
(2.480)
0.0253**
(2.560)
0.0646
(1.500)
0.0231***
(3.237)
0.0330***
(2.689)
PR 0.0348***
(4.187)
0.00930
(1.532)
0.0191***
(2.815)
0.0147**
(2.409)
0.0111*
(1.811)
0.0137**
(2.309)
Number of observations 445 505 493 461 518 453
Number of countries 85 90 92 88 95 85
Number of instruments 72 72 72 72 72 72
Hansen test (p-value) 0.199 0.0993 0.112 0.155 0.108 0.139
AR1 test (p-value) 3.25e-05 2.05e-07 8.71e-06 3.17e-05 1.61e-05 4.04e-06
AR2 test (p-value) 0.116 0.195 0.171 0.315 0.243 0.474
System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models; sample period: 1980–2012;
All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous;
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote rejection of null hypotheses for 1% , 5% and 10% of significance respectively;
t-statistics are reported in brackets; the excluded geo group in each regression is indicated in the column title.
4 Conclusions
The main objective of this paper was to build a political rivalry indicator and consequently a panel dataset
containing the political rivalry levels for the maximum number of countries and time span available, which
could be further used in a large variety of applications. Then, one possible application was tested by
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including the constructed political rivalry indicator as an explanatory variable in a dynamic panel data
growth regression model, for which a baseline regression and several robustness tests were implemented.
Factor analysis was applied as a basis for variables inclusion in the construction of the political rivalry
indicator. The results of factor analysis indicate that variables related to specific institutional quality
aspects are fundamental for defining the degree of political rivalry: strength and effectiveness of the
legal system, independence and impartiality of juditial system, protection of property rights, degree of
government responsiveness and its ability to carry out declared programs, political distortions of the
economic and financial environment, public observance of the law and overall institutional strength and
beaurocracy quality. Contrarily, political regime specific variables and natural resources rents do not
appear significant for determining a country’s level of political rivalry, according to the factor analysis
results. This data reduction exercise resulted in the construction of a reference political rivalry indicator,
comprising four variables, and of a panel dataset with political rivalry levels for 125 countries between
1984-2012. A preliminary analysis of this panel dataset shows that there are significant differences in the
political rivalry levels among countries depending on their income level and geographical location. These
clearly indicate that political rivalry is inversely related to the development level.
Regarding the inclusion of the political rivalry indicator in a growth regression, our baseline results
clearly indicate that political rivalry matters for economic growth, with a highly significant negative effect.
This effect is maintained when other political and institutional variables are simultaneously included in
the growth regression, and when the model is tested on a number of restricted samples, thus confirming
the robustness of the baseline results. Additionally, regression results for the restricted samples suggest
that the magnitude of the political rivalry negative effect on growth weakens as the development level
increases. In sum, our overall results thus suggest that economic growth can not be fully sustained at
higher levels without dealing with political rivalry issues.
The results and conclusions of this paper also present some interesting topics for future research. For
example, further research on this subject could try to identify the factors, present in more developed
countries, but absent in the less developed economies, which are able to weaken or absorb part of the
political rivalry’s negative effect on growth. Another issue for future research could be related to identifying
the different channels of transmission through which political rivalry may affect economic growth, using
structural, rather than reduced-form, growth regression models.
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Appendix A
Table 16: List of variables inititally considered for inclusion in the political rivalry indicator
Variables and sources Variables description
legis03 (CNTS) Effectiveness of the legislature.
national government revenue
and expenditure (CNTS)
Refers exclusively to central government and is reported without the
“extraordinary” expenditures financed by direct foreign aids or loans.
checks (DPI) Checks and balances based on legislative and executive indices of electoral
competitiveness.
political risk (ICRG) Index with twelve sub-components reflecting government’s ability to carry
out its declared programs and its ability to stay in office, corruption within
the political system as a threat to foreign investment and a distortion to the
economic and financial environment, strength of the legal system and public
observance of the law, degree of government responsiveness to its people,
overall institutional strength and beaurocracy quality, etc.
polity2 (POLITY IV) General regime effects (ranging from democracy to autocracy) evaluated in
terms of openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, constraints
on chief executive, and regulation and competitiveness of participation.
durable (POLITY IV) Regime durability expressed in the number of years since the last regime
change or the end of a transition period defined by the lack of stable political
institutions.
legal system & property rights
(EFW)
Index with nine sub-components measuring the judicial independence and
impartial courts, integrity of the legal system, legal enforcement of contracts,
military interference in rule of law and politics, protection of property rights,
regulatory restrictions, reliability of police, business costs of crime.
regulation (EFW) Index with three sub-components reflecting credit market, labour market and
business regulations.
government enterprises and
investment (EFW)
Rating constructed based on data (collected from a number of sources) on
government investment as a share of total investment.
indicator of public investment
efficiency (International
Monetary Fund Staff Report,
2015)
Indicator reflecting the relationship between the public capital stock and
indicators of quality and access to infrastructure assets.
natural resources rents (WDI) Sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents,
and forest rents (expressed as a % of GDP).
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Appendix B
Table 17: List of countries by geographical location
Geo group List of countries
geo1 American Samoa, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Greenland, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United
States, Virgin Islands (U.S.).
geo2 Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Guam, Hong Kong
SAR, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Korea, Dem. Rep. of Korea, Lao PDR, Macao SAR,
China, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Palau, Pakistan,
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Vietnam.
geo3 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
geo4 Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil,
Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Salvador,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad
and Tobago, Uruguay, Venzuela.
geo5 Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza,
Yemen.
geo6 Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic,
Chad, Comoros, Democratic Rep. of Congo, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
Madagasccar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,
São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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Table 18: List of countries by income level
Income group Countries
income1 Andorra, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Bermuda, Brunei
Darussalam, Canada, Cayman Islands, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republik, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Greenland, Guam, Hong Kong SAR, China, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macao SAR, China, Malta,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, St. Kitts and Nevis, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and
Tobago, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Virgin Islands (U.S.).
income2 Algeria, American Samoa, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Grenada, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, Namibia, Palau, Panama,
Peru, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Seychelles, South Africa, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and
Grenadines, Suriname, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uruguay, Venezuela.
income3 Albania, Armenia, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoir,
Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Georgia, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India,
Indonesia, Iraq, Kiribati, Kosovo, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Moldova,
Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Samoa,
São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian
Arab Republic, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam, West Bank and
Gaza,Yemen, Zambia.
income4 Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad,
Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritreia, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,
Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, North Korea, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zimbabwe.
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